Despite the US Dollar (USD) providing the basis for the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates, it has remained the world's reserve currency. However, the supremacy of the USD as an international reserve currency has been questioned and challenged following the global financial crisis of 2008-09, just as it had been on three other notable occasions in the past: during the 1960s when gold reserves were running short, in the 1980s when Japan was a rising star and in the late 1990s when the Euro came into existence. Each time, though, the "USD standard" has proved to be very resilient.
Barring a short period of reluctance on the part of private investors to invest in US paper (especially after the fall of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), demand for the USD actually increased sharply once the crisis turned global following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, because investors flocked to US Treasury Bills as a measure of "flight to safety".
On a more structural basis, the USD's share of world's reserves peaked at almost 85 percent in the early 1970s. But with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the share of USD in global reserves began to decline, reaching a trough of 50 percent in 1990, only to bounce back to about 60 percent during the late 1990s until 2009 (Table 3 .1). This time-frame (late 1990s onwards) also roughly coincides with the rapid accumulation of foreign reserves by Asian central banks which chose to maintain a large share of their massive reserves in USD assets. Beyond central banks' reserves, the USD continues to dominate private sector portfolio holdings and is the preferred unit of account for many crossborder transactions in Asia and elsewhere.
That said, it is also clear that a serious search for an alternative currency or a set of currencies to replace the USD as the international reserve currency has gathered momentum with the expected slowdown in the US economy over the medium and longer term and the unprecedented build-up of US government debt, financed mainly by foreigners. For instance, after the G20 summit in April 2009, China's central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan called for a "super-sovereign reserve currency" based on the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) floated by the IMF. The key rationale for pushing the SDR as an alternative to the USD is apparently to reduce the "exorbitant privilege" possessed by the USD in playing the role of the world's major reserve currency. Enabling the IMF to issue SDRs to quench the thirst of foreign central banks for international reserves would obviously translate into a conscious diversification well away from the USD.
An idea of this kind is, however, nothing new. In fact, it goes back to the era of Keynes in the 1940s, when he proposed the creation of an International Clearing Union that would issue a supranational reserve currency named "Bancor" -a currency based on the value of 30 commodities including gold. Zhou's comments ignited the debate, as did the publication of a United Nations Commission report led by Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, which recommended "a greatly expanded SDR" system similar to the "Bancor" idea proposed by Keynes. 1 It is useful to note that, at present, SDRs constitute only 4 percent of global reserves, even after efforts by the G20 to expand this pool by pumping in USD 250 billion (it subsequently transferred that allocation 
